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NOTES
The analogical application of this provision would have been
nothing unusual in a civilian jurisdiction, where, traditionally,
code provisions are held in high regard and applied generously to
factual contexts not within the strict purview of their terms.'0
Such an application of Article 3061 in the instant case and Muntz
v. Algiers would have led to the result which the court thought
desirable without exposing the court to suspicion that it disre-
garded the plain letter of the law.
It is therefore submitted that the instant case and the enig-
matic decision in Muntz v. Algiers do not reach wrong results.
Both can be justified, not as making an exception to Article 2286,
which admits of no exception and is of doubtful application, but
as reaching the result which the legislature dictated in the
analogous situation contemplated by Article 3061. Although the
rule they established is, as suggested above, unfair to plaintiffs,
this unfairness can be offset by according a judgment obtained
against the servant considerable weight as evidence of the serv-
ant's fault in the subsequent suit against the master." If this
were done, the added risk to which the master would be exposed,
that the plaintiff would seek to obtain a judgment against the
servant collusively, should serve to deprive plaintiffs of cause to
complain of the rule.
Donald J. Tate
LOUISIANA PRACTICF,-SPLITTING CAUSES OF ACTION
Plaintiff filed suit to recover for property damage sustained
in an automobile collision and, prior to trial, filed a second suit
against the same defendants for personal injuries arising from
the same accident. Trial of the property damage suit resulted in
a judgment for plaintiff, which was paid by defendants within a
few days. At that time a release was executed, signed only by
plaintiff, which recited:
"[T]his release shall in no way affect [plaintiff's] claim for
injuries . . . asserted against [defendants] in a second suit
now pending in the [same court]. The release herein granted
10. See Franklin, Equity in Louisiana: The Role o Article 21, 9 TULANE
L. REV. 485, 501 (1935); Morrow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification
and Legal Method for State and Nation, 17 TULANE L. REV. 351, 390 (1943).
11. RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS 481 (1942).
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being specifically confined to the claims for property damage
to . . . truck. .. ."
After securing this release defendants effected the dismissal
of plaintiff's second suit through an exception of no right of
action,' which was grounded on the theory that only one cause of
action arises out of a single tort. Plaintiff unsuccessfuly contended
that the portion of the release quoted above constituted a waiver
of defendant's legal right to have the second suit dismissed.
The court of appeal affirmed the judgment, finding (1) that
the release could not constitute a waiver of defendants' rights
because it was executed only by plaintiff; (2) only one cause of
action is created by a single tort. Fortenberry v. Clay, 68 So.2d
133 (La. App. 1953).
The Fortenberry case is an addition to a very old and har-
monious pattern of Louisiana decisions which forbid the splitting
of a cause of action.2 Though the holding is weakened by the
1. It would appear that the proper exception in this case would have
been that of "res judicata" rather than "no right of action." Cf. cases cited
note 2 infra.
2. Faurie v. Pitot, 2 Mart.(o.s.) 83 (1811); Succession of Mann, 4 La.
Ann. 28 (1849) (where principal amount had been recovered in one judg-
ment, a subsequent suit for interest was dismissed); Delahaye v. Pellerin, 2
Mart.(o.s.) 142 (1812) (where possession of a slave was recovered in one
suit, a subsequent suit for damages for wrongful detention of the slave
was dismissed); vascocu's Widow and Heirs v. Pavie, 14 La. 135 (1839)
(where a party evicted from land recovered the price paid and the value of
improvements from her vendor on a call in warranty, a subsequent suit for
damages for the Increased value of the land was dismissed on a plea of
res judicata); McCaleb v. Estate of Fluker, 14 La. Ann. 316 (1859) (where the
value of notes was recovered in one suit, a subsequent suit for attorney fees
was dismissed); Brooks v. Wortman, 22 La. Ann. 491 (1870) (where plaintiff
in reconvention in a petitory action secured judgment for the total amount
of the reconventional demand, then on appeal asked that the amount be
increased, the request was denied on the ground that plaintiff in reconven-
tion, having failed to amend his petition, must lose the overplus under
Article 156); Stafford v. Stafford, 25 La. Ann. 223 (1873) (where a wife recov-
ered part of the paraphernal funds in one suit, a subsequent suit for addi-
tional paraphernal funds was dismissed); State ex rel. Dobson v. Newman,
49 La. Ann. 52, 21 So. 189 (1897) (where seventeen ten dollar damage suits
were brought for one tort in justice of the peace court, it was held that
the complaints stated one indivisible cause of action which could not be
divided into a multiplicity of suits); Bargain Lumber Yard, Inc. v. Carbo,
142 So. 346 (La. App. 1932); Pic v. Mente & Co., Inc., 201 La. 237, 9 So.2d 532
(1942) (where two suits were brought in city court for amounts purchased
on one open account, the claims were held to constitute one indivisible cause
of action); Hemperly v. George Sliman & Co., 174 So. 673 (La. App. 1937)
(where intervenor in one suit prayed for recognition as owner of funds in a
bank account, and damages, and secured judgment for the former without
mention being made of the damages, a second suit to recover the damages
was dismissed on a plea of res judicata); Olivier & Sons, Inc. v. Board of
Com'rs of Lake Charles Harbor and Terminal Dist., 181 La. 802, 160 So. 419
(1935) (where one suit had been brought for damages for breach of contract,
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seeming importance which the court attributed to the fact that
defendants had not signed the release, it is submitted that the
plaintiff would not have been allowed to accomplish by conven-
tion what is forbidden by law. The theory behind the instant
case was recognized as early as Justinian's Code, which provided
that a suit to recover interest must be brought with the action
on the principal or be barred by the exception of res judicata .
The precept is a necessary one if litigation is to be minimized and
defendants spared the harassment and expense of a multiplicity
of suits.
In our written law, the prohibition against splitting a cause
of action is approached obliquely in the following provisions
of the Code of Practice:
Art. 91 (2): "But if one, in order to give jurisdiction to a
judge, demand a sum below that which is really due him, he
shall be presumed to have remitted the overplus, and after
having obtained judgment for the sum he had claimed, he
shall lose all right of action for that overplus."
Art. 156: "If one demands less than is due him, and do
not amend his petition, in order to augment his demand, he
shall lose the overplus."
Article 2065, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, presents an exception
to the general rule in providing that conjunctive obligations may
be severally enforced.4 The writer's attempt to trace the origin
of these provisions through the Projet of the Code of Practice of
a second suit for damages for breach of the same contract was dismissed
on an exception of res judicata); Kearney v. Fenerty, 185 La. 862, 171 So. 57
(1936) (where two suits were brought in city court on fifteen twenty-five
dollar rent notes containing an acceleration clause, it was held that non-
payment of the first note caused all fifteen to become a single matured
obligation for which only one suit could be brought); Thompson v. Kivett
& Reel, Inc., 25 So.2d 124 (La. App. 1946) (where a party involved in a truck
accident cashed a settlement draft covering his property damage, his sub-
sequent suit for personal injuries was dismissed on exceptions of res judi-
cata and estoppel). See also Reed v. Warren, 172 La. 1082, 136 So. 59 (1931);
Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., 178 La. 135, 150 So. 855 (1933) (where
survivors sued for wrongful death of a relative, it was held that the de-
ceased's right of action inherited by the heirs, and the heirs' own right of
action arising from the deceased's death, were but one indivisible cause of
action).
3. Coos 4.34.4.
4. "Where a sum is promised to be paid at different instalments, a con-
junctive obligation is created, and the payment may be severally paid or
enforced. Rents, payable at fixed periods, come also under this rule."
See Braridagee v. Chamberlin, 2 Rob. 207 (1842); Levy v. Telcide, 8 La.
App. 550 (1928).
1954]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
1825 and the Projet of the Civil Code of 1825 revealed that no
source notes or comments are given for any of the articles.
French law achieves a result similar to that found in Loui-
siana, but approaches the problem through a limitation on testi-
monial proof of claims. The French rule has its origin in Article
6, Title 20, French Civil Ordinance of 1667, and is restated in
Article 1346 of the French Civil Code.5 Article 1346 states that all
claims not substantiated by a writing must be sued for in one
action; but Articles 13476 and 13487 provide two very broad excep-
tions. The rule does not apply when the claimant has "a com-
mencement of proof in writing, i.e., a written document emanat-
ing from the person against whom the claim is made ... which
makes the fact alleged probable." Neither does the rule apply to
cases wherein it is impossible for the claimant to obtain written
proof of the debtor's obligation, such as claims which arise out
of quasi-contracts and torts.9 It should also be noted that these
Civil Code provisions are not controlling over purely commercial
matters, that is, transactions between merchants. 10
The Code of Civil Procedure of Quebec forbids the splitting of
a cause of action in clear and concise terms in the second paragraph
of Article 87: "A creditor cannot divide his debt for the purpose
of suing for the several portions of it by different actions." This
provision is also traceable to Article 6, Title 20, French Civil Ordi-
nance of 1667, and to Article 1346 of the French Civil Code."
5. "Every claim, no matter how founded, which is not entirely substan-
tiated by a writing, must be made by the same writ, after which any other
claims which are not evidenced by a writing shall be barred."
6. "The rules above given are not applicable when there is a commence-
ment of proof in writing, i.e., a written document emanating from the person
whom he represents, which makes the fact alleged probable."
7. "There is a further exception to be made to the above rules, i.e., when-
ever It was impossible for the creditor to obtain a written proof of the
obligation under which the debtor was to him. This second exception is
applicable (1) to obligations which arise out of quasi-contracts, criminal
offences and torts; (2) deposits which had to be made owing to a fire, a
house falling down, a tumult, or a shipwreck, and to deposits made by trav-
ellers when living in an inn, regard being had to the positions in which the
parties stood to one another, and the circumstances of each case; (3) to
obligations entered Into owing to unforeseen accidents when it was fimpossible
to draw up a writing; (4) to a case where a creditor has lost his document
of title, which was his written proof, in consequence of an event which was
unforeseen, or the result of force majeure."
8. Art. 1347, FRENCH CIVIL CODE.
9. Art. 1348, FRENCH CIVIL CODE.
10. 7 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT9 PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 1525
(2d ed. 1954); Cass. 29 juillet 1918, D. 1918, 1, 59.
11. COMMISSIONERS' REPORTS, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF LOWER CANADA Art.
15 (1866).
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NOTES
The Louisiana State Law Institute's proposed Code of Prac-
tice Revision will not recommend changes in this area of our
procedural law. Article 6 of the proposed title on Civil Actions,
based upon a combination of the Quebec law, Louisiana juris-
prudence, Articles 91 (2) and 156 of the present Code of Practice,
and Article 2065, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, reads as follows:
"An obligee cannot divide an obligation for the purpose
of bringing separate actions on different portions thereof.
If he brings an action to enforce only a portion of the obliga-
tion, and does not amend his pleading to demand the enforce-
ment of the full obligation, he shall lose his right to enforce
the remaining portion.
"These rules do not apply to conjunctive obligations.' 2
Charles W. Darnall, Jr.
12. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF PRACTICE REVISION, EXPOSh DES
MOTIFS No. 5, p. 13 (1954), gives the following sources for Article 6: First sen-
tence, Art. 87(2), CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF QUEBEC, and Louisiana jurispru-
dence. Second sentence, Arts. 91(2), 156, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870. Third
sentence, Art. 2065, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
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